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Abstract 
Restraint of trade and implied duties in the employment relationship can impose a 
heavy burden on employees. For many people, their only real asset is the ability to 
work. This should only be prevented with good reason. Over the centuries the 
courts have evolved a complex system for analysing the validity of employment 
restraints. In 1946, Lord Moulton commented: 
As I see it, the court stands in a sense between Scylla and Charybdis, because it would be 
most unfortunate if anything we said, or any other court said, should place an undue 
restriction on the right ofa workman[ .. . ], to make use of his leisure for his profit. 
Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Ltd [ 1946] 2 All ER 350, at 356. 
Unfortunately it cannot be said that the approach to restraint of trade taken by the 
New Zealand courts reflects this admonition of caution. The courts, particularly the 
Court of Appeal, are steering the restraint of trade doctrine onto the rocks rather 
than skilfully navigating Lord Moulton' s Scylla and Charybdis. 
This paper surveys the development and current state of the law relating to restraint 
of trade, implied duties, and jurisdictional issues that affect the application of the 
doctrine. The current United States trends discussed help to clarify the outlines of 
our analysis of restrictive covenants, and to warn of pitfalls. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 15,284 words. 
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I Introduction 
A Wltat is Restraint of Trade? 
Scicom is a nationwide scientific instrumentation wholesaler. John Timms has worked 
for his employer Scicom for several years. John has moved up through the ranks of the 
company and is now employed as the North Island senior manager. He is responsible for 
strategic planning and sales and routinely deals with information of a sensitive nature. 
John is, so to speak the public face of Scicom. The company is aware of the importance 
of John's role within the company and of the influence he has over clients. When the 
company promoted John it drafted a restrictive covenant, preventing John from dealing 
with current clients of Scicom for a period of six months, in the North Island. The 
restriction does not prevent John dealing with former clients of Scicom. As consideration 
for John entering into the restraint the company agreed to pay him the equivalent of six 
months pay. This sum could be uplifted after the restraint period had ended. 
Pete Symonds is a helicopter pilot. He has been trained by his employer, has completed 
post training bonded period and now seeks employment elsewhere. Pete is held to the 
terms of a restrictive covenant on the grounds that the employer trained him and the 
replacement pilot is not as skilled as he was. 
1 Furthermore, he is prevented from doing 
business with a company which has specifically indicated to the employer that they 
operate on a preferred pilot policy as opposed to a preferred company policy 
2 
Cate is dismissed from her position because she is having a relationship with an employee 
of a rival firm. The judge holds that her dismissal was justified for good business 
reasons.3 
1 Marine Helicopters Ltd v Stevenson and Fann Helicopters Ltd Unreported, Employment Court, Auckland 
Registry, 25 June 1996, AEC 30/96, A 168/95 at 15. 
2 Above n 1, at p 5. 
3 Northern Clerical Workers Union v Printpac UEB Carton [1989] I NZJLR 644. 
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The courts' interpretation and application of the restraint of trade doctrine and implied 
duties is more likely to resemble the latter examples. The doctrine of restraint of trade 
typically applies to the situation where a former employee uses confidential information 
gained during the employment relationship to compete in a subsequent employment 
relationship. The alleged risk posed or breach may encompass using confidential 
information, poaching clients or soliciting former staff. The threat posed has been 
intensified by the development of information technology.
4 Restrictive covenants take the 
form of a standard form contract with little or no option of negotiation. The terms are 
usually dictated by the party with greater bargaining power. The doctrine requires a 
careful balancing of factors from a wide variety of areas. Considerations as varying as 
commercial contracts, public policy, economics and equity are involved. 
5 Restraint of 
trade in relation to goods and the sale of goodwill in businesses is extensively dealt with 
by antitrust law and common law. For the purposes of this paper the main focus will be 
on the effect of restrictive covenants in the employment market. 
B Objectives 
This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the doctrine of restraint of trade, and 
related issues such as implied duties in the employment relationship. This is to determine 
the extent to which an employer may restrict its employees' right to concurrent or future 
work. The paper will look at the way in which these doctrines have been interpreted by 
the New Zealand courts and the extent to which the approach differs from the traditional 
analysis of restraint of trade. 
The interface between injunctive relief and the operation of the doctrine of restraint of 
trade will be covered. Restrictive covenants fall within the jurisdictions of the 
4 For a further discussion see: lan Smith "Dealing with the Disloyal Employee" 142 New Law Journ
al, 1992, 
at 164. 
5 See M. J Trebilcock The Common Law of Restraint of Trade Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 1986. 
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Employment Court, Employment Tribunal, High Court and the Court of Appeal.
6 This 
can give rise to some differences in the interpretation and application of restrictive 
covenants. Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the two courts is the 
approach to modification of restrictive covenants. The High Court and Court of Appeal 
proceed on the basis that restrictive covenants should be allowed to stand, with the most 
unreasonable provisions severed so as to allow the covenant to be enforced. The 
Employment Court approaches the problem from the point of view that restrictive 
covenants are prima facie void and that a covenant with no attempt at reasonableness 
should not be allowed to stand. The Employment Court has the power to rewrite a 
contract. Such power is used sparingly. The Employment Court prefers to look at the 
overall reasonableness of the covenant, not just the effect of an isolated provision. 
Approaches taken in selected states from the United States will be considered. The states 
mentioned are selected to indicate different ways in which restrictive covenants can be 
dealt with. This facilitates an inquiry into whether correct and desirable considerations 
are being taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of the restraint . There is 
an advantage to be gained from evaluating overseas structures in that American states 
have developed specific solutions for dealing with restrictive covenants. Some of these 
could be usefully implemented in New Zealand. United States law charts potential 
developments that may affect our interpretation and application of law relating to 
restraint of trade. 
It is unlikely in the short term that the use of restrictive covenants will decrease. New 
Zealand must assess whether it is desirable to continue to apply the same tests that we 
have thus far. It is time to rethink our approach to restrictive covenants. Specific types of 
covenant could be developed that more specifically target that which the employer is 
entitled to protect. This would dispense with some of the uncertainties in the present 
system of analysis of restrictive covenants. 
6 Unless otherwise indicated a reference to the High Court includes the Court of Appeal and a reference to 
the Employment Court includes the Employment Tribunal. 
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II ~Freedom of Occupation 
Restraint of trade affects freedom to choose an occupation and an employer. Implied 
duties and restraint of trade hinder employees' present and future employment 
opportunities. Freedom of occupation was hard won and is regarded by many as a 
fundamental right. These doctrines are not the only hindrances to freedom of occupation. 
Sexual discrimination and disability discrimination can restrict entry or hinder retention in 
the labour market. The lack of creche facilities and the toothlessness of maternity 
legislation act as a very real restriction on freedom of occupation. The right to strike can 
be argued as a right fundamental to the expression of freedom of occupation. In New 
Zealand the right to strike exists in name alone as one cannot take positive legal steps to 
exercise the right. Each of these points in worthy of further exploration, which is 
impossible within the confines of this paper. 
III Theories and Legal Background to Restraint of Trade 
A Theory 
The doctrine of restraint of trade has always reflected the political and econorruc 
situation of the time. The doctrine has adapted over the years to reflect the prevailing 
economic theories. Thus there has been a movement from a mercantilist emphasis on 
freedom of trade to one of freedom of contract. There has been a trend in favour of 
upholding restrictive covenants, despite a general trend towards increasing economic 
liberalisation and labour market deregulation. More latterly there has been a swing in 
favour of an economic theory that takes account of externalities. This recognises that 
freedom of contract is not always in the public interest. 
7 
7 For a discussion of the economic theories underlying restraint of trade see above n 5, at 29 ff 
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Restrictive covenants are used by employers for a variety of reasons. Trade secrets are 
an obvious example of where the employer may seek to enforce a restraint. In many 
cases the employer is seeking to protect something more. The employer may seek to 
enforce a restrictive covenant so that it can realise the outlay made investing in training 
an employee. The covenant returns the initial investment and increases the employer's 
profits. It operates as a double edged sword, acting as a disincentive to the employee 
leaving and maximising the employer' s recoup on initial training investment. This is not a 
legitimate use of a restrictive covenant, the employer has no right to attempt to 
monopolise the employee' s skills. 
1 Sale of Goodwill v Pre-Employment Restrictive Covenants 
There is a fundamental difference between a non competition agreement that is tied to 
the sale of a business and a general restrictive covenant in the employment context. 
Parity of bargaining power is more likely to exist between the vendor and purchaser, than 
between an employer and employee. When the business is sold the purchase price is 
consideration for the physical property, the goodwill, the transfer of the business and a 
covenant not to compete. 
8 The transaction is carried out at arm' s length and it is usual 
that legal advice is sought prior to entering into the transaction. The seller gets financial 
benefit from the transaction and negotiates the terms, so there is more likelihood that the 
benefit will be proportionate to what is being ceded. 
2 Pre-Employment Restrictive Covenants 
This is in contrast to the situation where there is an existing employment relationship. 
The prospective employee is generally presented with a standard package. There is often 
little opportunity to object to or negotiate the terms presented. The employee is faced 
8 GP Kohn "A Fresh Look: Lowering the Mortality Rate of Covenants Not To Compete Ancillary To 
Employment Contracts And To Sale Of Business Contracts In Georgia" 31 Emory Law Journal, 635, at 
639. 
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with accepting or refusing the offer. The employee will sign the non competition 
agreement because it is a precondition for employment with the firm. When a restraint is 
entered into prior to employment the employer does not have to provide any 
consideration. Yet, due to the imbalance of bargaining power, this is a time at which the 
employee is vulnerable. A prospective employee is less likely to seek legal advice about 
the provisions of a restrictive covenant. It is not yet the norm in New Zealand to seek 
legal advice prior to entering into an employment relationship. In a sale and purchase 
transaction it is usual that the vendor has recourse to legal advice. The employer does 
not purchase goodwill when it hires an employee. The employer purchases the 
employee's skills and knowledge. A post employment restrictive covenant is not 
necessary for the employer to get the full value of what is being acquired ie the 
employee's services.
9 A restraint that applies beyond the life of the employment 
relationship is something extra for which consideration should be given. It is relatively 
uncommon for the employee to be compensated for agreeing to be bound by a restrictive 
covenant. 
3 Partnerships 
Restraints involved with partnerships differ from restraints in the employment context. 
The differences are perhaps best illustrated by a case from Georgia. In Rash v Toccoa 
Clinic Medical Associates the former partner of a medical practice was bound by the 
provisions of a restrictive covenant from which he sought relief. 
10 The court surveyed the 
existing state of law. Generally, restrictive covenants were deemed to fall into the 
category of an unreasonable restraint of trade. The Court concluded that a twenty-five 
mile restriction was acceptable because the partner had contractually agreed that the 
covenant was reasonable. He had agreed that to breach the covenant would result in 
9 For a further discussion see H.M. Blake "Postemployment Restraints" 73 Harvard Law Review 625, at 
647. 
10 320 SE 2d 170 (Ga 1984 ). 
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harm to the partnership.
11 At the same time the partner obtained the benefit of the other 
partners agreeing to be bound by the same restriction. 
Inequality of bargaining power is a relevant consideration m the assessment of the 
validity of a restrictive covenant. However partnership structures militate against a 
presumption that there is an inequality of bargaining power.
12 There is an obvious mutual 
benefit. 
B CaseLaw 
I Common Law 
Restrictive covenants restrict a former employee's ability to work in an industry or a 
particular geographical area for a specified period of time. They may also restrict the 
persons or businesses with whom the employee may deal. Non competition covenants 
originated in the fifteenth century.
13 Courts were initially reluctant to enforce the 
provisions, as they were regarded as an unreasonable restriction on an employee's 
freedom to work 
The developments of the seventeenth century heralded an assumption of more equal 
bargaining power between the worker and employer. During this period the test for 
reasonableness was introduced. Restraint clauses were acceptable if they were related to 
the sale of a business and were limited in scope. In the eighteenth century the test was 
extended to apply to the employment relationship. Mitchell v Reynolds drew a distinction 
between particular and general restraints and weighed the social utility of them against 
the undesirable effects on the public and the covenantor.
14 Gradually the courts adapted 
11 Above n 10, at 174 
12 Above n 10, at 173. 
13 For a further discussion of the historical basis of restraint of trade see J.D. Heydon The Restraint of 
Trade Doctrine 1971 , London, Butterworths 
14 24 Eng.Rep 347, QB (1711 ). 
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the Mitchell v Reynolds test. 15 In Horner v Graves the Court held that it was not bound 
to look only at the terms of the restraint, but could also look at any other relevant facts . 
16 
The question was thus framed : 
whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in 
favour of whom it is given. and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.
17 
The Court analysed the restraint in terms of what was reasonable, on the facts of the case 
before the Court. This remained the legal approach until 1853 when the Queen ' s Bench 
held that the burden fell on the covenantor to show that the restraint was unreasonable. 
18 
This was no doubt largely due to the laissez-faire approach to trade and commerce that 
prevailed at the time. In 1913 Mason v Provident Clothing & Supply Co
19 and in 1916 
Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelb/
0 established many of the tests that we now consider 
central to assessment of the validity of restrictive covenants. The cases established that 
restrictive covenants in the employment context are different from more general 
restraints of trade. The employer must show that the restraints are no broader than 
necessary for the employer' s reasonable protection and that the restraint is reasonable, 
for both the employer and employee. Restraints that simply aim to protect against future 
competition were held to be unjustified. The more modern definition of restraint of trade 
is fairly broad. Lord Reid in Essa Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper 's Garage (Stourport) Ltd 
defined it as an employee giving up a freedom that they would otherwise have had.
2 1 The 
common law regards restrictive covenants as prima facie invalid because they are 
contrary to public policy. To an extent this incorporates a certain amount of welfarist 
policy. Public policy can be defined at two levels, freedom to earn a living and the 
15 Above n 14. 
16 131 Eng. Rep. 232 (1839). 
17 Aboven 16, at287. 
18 Tallis v Tallis 118 Eng.Rep 482 ( 1853). 
19 [1913]AC724. 
20 [1916] l AC 688. 
21 Essa Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper 's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269. 
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public's interest in freedom to choose with whom to do business. A covenant would only 
be enforced if the employer could show that it was necessary to protect a proprietary 
interest and that it did so in a reasonable way. Competition per se cannot be guarded 
against, only unfair competition. 
2 American State Approaches 
The United States law regarding restraints largely evolved from the English approach to 
the area. 22 In restraint cases the courts are less reluctant than those in the United 
Kingdom to base decisions on public policy.
23 By 1898 the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed a formulation of circumstances in which a restraint of trade would be valid as 
being consonant with public interest. 
24 In contrast, Michigan prohibited restrictive 
covenants until 1985, when the State passed the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act. 
25 
Promises by former employees not to compete are classed as restraints ancillary to a 
lawful contract. Such restraints were enforceable if they were reasonably necessary to 
protect the employer's business from danger or to protect against loss caused by an 
employee's unjust use of confidential knowledge acquired in the course of the 
employment. In determining reasonableness the duration and geographical scope of the 
restraint was not to be any larger than was necessary to protect the employer in its 
established trade. The Supreme Court case of Briggs v Butler stated that covenants 
could be enforced where they: 
do not impose a restraint beyond that reasonably required for the protection of the employer in his 
business are not unreasonably restrictive upon the rights of the employee and do not contravene 
public policy26 
22 Above n 14. 
23 See Heydon above n 13, at 34. 
24 United States v Addysto11 Pipe and Steel Co 85 F.271 (6th Circuit 1898) affmned 175 US 211 ( 1899) as 
set out in T.J. Collin "Antitrust Law: Restrictive Covenants and Reasonableness" 24 Akron Law Review 
479, 485 . 
25 From 1905 until 1985 restrictive covenants were prohibited by ss 445.771 -778 of the Michigan 
Competition Laws Annotated. 
26 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 NE 2d 757 (1 942 ), at 763. 
14 
The Supreme Court applied the "blue pencil" test. 
27 In l!,xtine v Williamson Midwest Inc 
the Court upheld the reasonable parts of a restraint clause that could be severed from the 
unreasonable provisions without having to rewrite the contract.
28 
Washington focuses attention on the public interest element of restraint of trade. The 
public interest in maintaining the goodwill of the business, in receiving services from a 
chosen professional, and the individual's right to work are balanced. The harm that an 
employee would suffer by being deprived of livelihood and public interest in encouraging 
competition are important considerations. In spite of this theoretically equitable approach 
the Court largely favours the employer. In the landmark decision of Perry v Moran an 
accountant directed not to serve any of the employer's clients, was ordered to pay 
liquidated damages for accepting business from the employer's former clients. 
29 The 
restriction was arguably unreasonable as there had been no significant personal contact 
between the client and the accountant. There was no legitimate interest to protect. 
C Legislative Protection 
New Zealand has no constitutional guarantee of freedom of occupation. Such safeguards 
as exist are to be found in international conventions, common law and legislation. Some 
American states have chosen to adopt a legislative approach to restraint of trade. The 
approach varies from Florida where the legislature has sought to codify the factors that 
the Court must assess, and Georgia, which stringently limits the application of restrictive 
covenants. Further legislative protection may be an option that New Zealand should 
consider. 
27 le the common law doctrine of severance. 
28 76 Ohio St 403, 200 NE 2d 297 (1964). 
29 748 P.2d 224 ( 1987). 
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1 Employment Contracts Act 1991 
The long title of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 states that the Act is designed to 
promote freedom of association. The provisions of the Act provide limited protection 
against the more excessive restraints on freedom of occupation. No reference is made to 
the role of employee associations (unions) in this new industrial regime. Ostensibly, it is 
for the employer to choose whether to recognise a union bargaining representative. No 
framework for the settlement of disputes is provided, as the underlying presumption is 
that workers can negotiate their employment conditions directly with the employer. 
Union power has been significantly weakened by the advent of the Act. The personal 
grievances provisions of the Act recognise other forms of restraints on freedom of 
occupation. 30 Personal grievances cover sexual harassment, duress in relation to union 
activity and any other activity which affects access and the reasonable enjoyment of 
employment. Section 29 provides additional protection on the basis of sexual 
harassment. Elements of social protection are contained in legislation such as the 
Minimum Wages Act, Holidays Act and the Human Rights Act. These bottom line 
protections have come under fire from the New Right who argue that they inhibit the 
development of a free market economy. The New Right advocate that an employment 
contract should be treated on the same basis as any other commercial contract. On this 
analysis it would be thought that restrictive covenants would be opposed on the grounds 
that they inhibit the operation of a free labour market. The New Right philosophy as 
expressed by the Chicago school aims for an unregulated labour market, freedom of 
contract and employment at will .31 Restrictive covenants are designed to limit an 
employee' s freedom of association. A balance therefore has to be struck between the 
public interest and the legitimate protection of goodwill and customer contacts in 
business. The concept of reasonableness is to be judged from the viewpoint of both 
parties, and measured against the public interest. 32 
30 s 31 Employment Contracts Act 1991 . 
31 For a discussion of Chicago School of Economic theories see l.L 0 . Schmidt; J.B. Rittaler A Critical 
Evaluation of the Chicago School of Antitrust Analy sis Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1989. 
32 Debtor Management (NZ) Ltd v Quail [ 1993) 2 ERNZ 498. 
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2 Commerce Act 1986 
The Commerce Act 1986 will only check restraint of trade if it has the effect of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. 
33 Restraints occur on a case by case 
basis, not industry wide, so this precondition is unlikely to be satisfied. 
3 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Section 17 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides for freedom of association. 
Reasonable limits may be imposed on the freedoms by virtue of s 5. The difficulty in 
relying on the Bill of Rights is that restrictive covenants are contracts and not laws 
enacted by Parliament, and so the scope of application of the Bill of Rights is 
questionable. However, if the employee performed a public function it could be argued 
that the Bill of Rights would apply. The New Zealand Bill of Rights was raised in the 
Medic Corp case but was not fully discussed. 
34 
4 International Obligations 
The operation of restrictive covenants may also conflict with the principles enunciated in 
international conventions which New Zealand has ratified.
35 Such clauses arguably 
impact on the objectives set out in the Declaration of Philidelphia.
36 One of the most 
obvious effects of restrictive covenants is that they prevent an individual from providing 
for their economic well-being for a period of time, within a given occupation. This 
33 See ss 7(1) and 28 Commerce Act 1986. 
34 Medic Corp v Barrett [l 992J 3 ERNZ 523 . 
35 ILO Convention 122; Article 1 provides: 
There is freedom of choice of employment and the fullest possible opportmlity for each worker to qualify 
for, and to use his skills and endowmeuls, in a job for wllich he is well suited, irrespective of race, colour, 
religion, political opinion, national extraction and social origin Article I Universal Declaration of Human 
Righls. 
36 A founding documents of the ILO, which outlines the organisation ' s philosophy. 
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adversely affects the right to work and right to free choice of employment contained in 
Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
5 American State Legislative Approaches to Restraint of Trade 
Some federal jurisdictions have adopted a legislative approach to restraint of trade. This 
has the advantage of concretising the factors relevant to an analysis of restrictive 
covenants. Section 542.33 of Florida's Regulation of Trade, Commerce, Investments and 
Solicitations Act 1990 specifies that a court may not grant an injunction if a non 
competition agreement is contrary to the public health, safety or welfare, if in all the 
circumstances it is unreasonable, or if no irreparable injury to the employer is shown. 
37 
Prior to 1953, no Florida court had enforced a non competition covenant against an 
employee. The 1990' s saw a reversal of fortune . In Atlas Travel Service Inc v Morelly 
the validity of a two year period of restraint was upheld as the Court held that there was 
no public interest in the availability of the employee's services.
38 Irreparable harm is now 
only presumed where the employee uses trade secrets or customer lists, or directly 
solicits the employer' s clients. 
Georgia's statute dealing with restraint of trade has a narrow application. 
39 The 
definition of employee includes only executives, officers, managers, research and 
development personnel and people possessing significant confidential information or 
abilities. The definition specifically excludes any employee "who lacks selective or 
specialised skills, learning, customer contacts or abilities. "
40 Furthermore a restraint must 
be limited to the area in which the employee was working at the time of termination. The 
activities prohibited must bear a reasonable resemblance to those that the employee 
37 This was a reaction to the judgrnent in Capraro v Lanier Business Products Inc 466 SO 2d 212. where it 
was said that there would be a presumption of irreparable harm where there was a breach of a restrictive 
covenant. Judge Overton 's dissenting judgrnent sparked the impetus for refonn. 
38 98 So 2d 816 (1987). 
39 GA Laws 1676, GA Code Ann. ss 13-8-2 -2 .1. 
40 GA Code Ann. ss 13-8-2. l(cXiXB). 
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previously performed for the employer. The solicitation and acceptance of prior clients of 
the former employer are permitted. The restraint can only prohibit the solicitation of 
customers with whom the employee had material prior contact.
41 Material contact is 
defined as direct business dealings, confidential information, sales negotiations etc. 
Legislation may help to cement and clarify the law relating to restraint of trade. The 
notion of restricting the application of restraints to certain types of employee is an 
innovative way of limiting the scope of restraints. 
American and New Zealand courts have similar problems scopmg the terms of a 
restraint. In Michigan a court assessed a restraint of trade clause and decided that a one 
year restraint over a fifty mile radius was reasonable. No reasons were given justifying 
the conclusion.
42 The American experience shows how even when the policy 
considerations of restraint of trade have been worked out, there can still be practical 
difficulties in how the theory is to be applied. 
IV Restrictive Covenants in New Zealand 
A Criteria 
A restrictive covenant can apply to the goodwill attached to a business that is being sold. 
It also applies to an employee covenanting not to compete with a former employer by 
working for a rival firm or by starting their own business. The restraint typically involves 
a covenant not to work but can also require that compensation be paid to the former 
employee. A restrictive covenant is usually unilaterally imposed as opposed to being the 
outcome of mutual bargaining. 
43 
41 s 13-8-2.I(cX3). 
42 Robert Half International Inc v Van Steenis 784 Fed Supp 1263 ( 1991 ). 
43 Kemp v NZRFL (1989) 2 NZELC 96. The problem with this approach is that it can take considerable time 
to gain a Court fixture . 
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Restrictive covenants affect subsequent employers. This effect should be monitored to 
ensure that it does not have an unhealthy effect on labour market mobility and efficiency. 
The effect is more stark in a specialised area, where skilled workers are in high demand 
and training takes a considerable period of time. Restrictive covenants are prima facie 
void once the employment relationship has ended. A valid clause may only seek to 
prevent unfair competition. A blanket ban on competition is not a valid form of 
restriction. The former employer must show that there is an actual or realistically 
potential misuse of trade secrets or customer connections. It is insufficient that the 
employee is using skills or knowledge obtained while on the former employer' s payroll. 
44 
A third party may not be immune to liability if they induce someone to breach an 
unreasonable restrictive covenant. An application to the Court to consider the validity of 
the clause is a preferable course of conduct. 
45 
1 Proprietary Interest 
A fundamental requirement of a restrictive covenant 1s that there is an identified 
proprietary interest that the employer seeks to protect. The problem is that this 
requirement has been loosely interpreted by the courts. There is a blurring of the 
distinction between what constitutes an identifiable proprietary asset and more general 
restraint on the employee' s future use of skills. A restrictive covenant can only be used 
to protect an employer' s proprietary interest, not the personal following of the employee. 
46 There must be an identifiable asset, a trade secret, trade connections or confidential 
information. There is a common law duty not to reveal confidential information during 
the course of the employment relationship and for some time afterwards. A restrictive 
covenant operates beyond this. Such covenants are used to protect the goodwill of a 
business. 47 In Business Associates Ltd v Telecom Telecom recruited the plaintiff's 
44 Herbert Morris vSaxelby (1 916] AC 688, 709. 
45 DB Breweries v Marshall [ 1994] l ERNZ 98. 
46 Radio Horowhenua Ltd v Bradley [ 1993] 2 ERNZ I 085. This point appears to have been overlooke
d by 
Finnigan J in his analysis in Marine Helicopters v Stevenson . See above n 1. 
47 Cooney v Welsh (1993] 1 ERNZ 1. 
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employee after contractual disputes resulted in Business Associates not being given any 
further work.48 Telecom was aware of the restrictive covenants. Business Associates 
established that there was a proprietary interest to protect, in respect of the trade 
connection with Telecom. The plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of doing business 
with Telecom in the future, even though there was no present contractual arrangement 
between the parties. The Court awarded the plaintiff damages inducement to breach of 
contract. This case is problematic in that the Court is prepared to grant protection to the 
plaintiff's hope of future business contacts with Telecom. It could not be said that there 
was an existing trade connection requiring protection. 
2 Springboard Concept 
The springboard concept means that an employee is not allowed to take unfair advantage 
of information gained in their previous employment relationship. In Rank Xerox NZ Ltd v 
U-Bix Copiers NZ Ltd and Adamson the defendant was bound by a three month 
restraint. Judge Sinclair determined that if a plaintiff had accepted the terms of the 
contract he could not later seek to repudiate them unless the provts1on was 
unreasonable. 49 The defendant had access to information regarding the marketing 
strategies of the plaintiff company and the employer was properly entitled to keep this 
information to itself The employee was not entitled to use information obtained during 
his employment as a "springboard" into a new employment relationship. The area that 
the restraint applied to was not excessive and the duration was considered reasonable. 
50 
The balance of convenience favoured upholding the restraint. Mr Adamson would suffer 
little financial harm as a result of the order, Ubix would probably suffer some 
inconvenience but this was balanced against the company's imputed knowledge of the 
covenant. The judge commented: 
48 [1992] 4 TCLR 685. 
49 Unreported, , High Court, Auckland Registry, 29 October 1985, A.1276/ 85. 
50 Limited to 3 months. 
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By employing him in the manner in which it did, it sought to obtain a commercial advantage, a
nd 
the commercial advantage must have been for its own benefit at the expense of competito
rs 
including Xerox. It now ill behoves, in my view, Ubix to complain that it may and will suffer
 
some loss and inconvenience if it is prevented from acting as it otherwise would have had M
r 
Adamson ' s employment with its company not been subject to any restrictions at all. 
51 
In Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v lnglis
52 the covenant prohibited the 
defendant from working for a competitor for six months. 
53 The clause purported to apply 
regardless of the duration of the defendant ' s employment with the plaintiff The plaintiff 
had to establish that it sought to protect its property, as opposed to the personal 
aptitudes of the employee. The plaintiff argued that if the defendant left the corporation 
he would take advertisers with him. The company sought to protect the recurring 
business relationship with its clients. This was properly within the scope of protection. 
These cases are now over a decade old. The restraint was relatively short, three to six 
months. Since then the length of restraints has increased substantially. Fact situations that 
justified a three month period of restraint should not be used to support a longer 
restriction. 
3 Reasonableness 
The concept of reasonableness by nature lends itself to indeterminacy. Reasonableness is 
assessed at the time that the contract is entered into and both parties' perspectives are 
taken into account. 
54 If the restraint was entered into at the time of employment, courts 
are more favourably disposed towards upholding its validity.
55 There are problems 
associated with the assessment of reasonableness. Theoretically there is greater freedom 
of choice at the outset of the employment relationship. This ignores the reality that many 
51 Above n 49, at 20. 
52 Unreported, , 21 JW1e 1984, A.141/ 84. 
53 Hardie Boys J held that 6 months was a reasonable period of restraint, both from the plaintiff and 
defendant's viewpoint, at p 15 . 
54 MA Watson Electrical Ltd v Kelling [1993] 1 ERNZ 9. 
55 BCNZ v Nielsen ( 1988) 2 NZELC 96,040. 
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employees possess little bargaining power and must accept employment on the t
erms 
offered. The employer might be said to use the opportunity of an offer of employme
nt to 
gain a competitive advantage that will extend beyond the term of the employ
ment 
relationship. The time that the clause was incorporated into the contract is relevant.
 If a 
restrictive covenant is entered into during the course of the employment relation
ship 
some form of valuable consideration must be given in return. 
56 If a clause is inserted in 
the course of the employment relationship additional consideration would be requir
ed. 57 
The logic behind this may lie in interpreting it as meaning that the original contra
ctual 
terms have been varied. This writer suggests that consideration should also be give
n in 
cases where there is a pre-employment negotiation of a restrictive covenant 
Whether or not the employee actually had access to confidential information is a rele
vant 
inquiry. The employee must have been of such seniority that they had acces
s to 
confidential material. 
58 Restraints applying to non managerial staff are less likely to be 
upheld. The relative bargaining position of the parties is assessed in the Court's balan
cing 
test. 59 Covenants have been subject to special scrutiny where the defendant was yo
ung, 
inexperienced, or had not sought independent advice. 
The proportional effects on the parties are a relevant criterion guiding the Co
urt's 
assessment of the merits of the case. 
60 In some cases it may be more acceptable and 
expedient to insert a "garden leave provision".
61 A restrictive covenant that purports to 
apply irrespective of termination is more likely to be found unreasonable by the Cou
rt. 62 
56This is because of the asswnption that employees are free to choose to accept the p
osition in knowledge of 
the restriction, and because it is at least theoretically part of the negotiating proces
s. This represents a 
quantwn leap in asswnptions, ignores the imbalance of bargaining power and does not address the
 issue 
of consideration. See also Radio Horowhenua v Bradley above n 46, at 1085 . 
57 See Force Four NZ Ltd v Curtling (1994] I ERNZ 542. 
58 Above n 14. 
59 Above n 52. 
60 Above n 46 . 
61Garden leave is a period of protracted leave during which time the employee is pai
d but cannot work or 
seek employment elsewhere. 
62 Above n 46 . 
LAN usr.AnY . 
y1CTORIA U[..IIVERSITY OF WELUNG roN. 
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The clause will not be effective if it is later found that the employee was wrongfully 
dismissed. 63 
The points are well illustrated in Royal v Axon Computer Systems Ltd. 
64 The employment 
contract contained a restrictive covenant. The plaintiff left the company, commenced 
work with a new employer and sought a declaration that he was not bound by the 
restrictive covenant. The defendant company sought an injunction enforcing the restraint. 
The Court held that Axon's restraint was aimed at preventing competition, no 
substantive proprietary interest was identified by the company. A strict observance of the 
restraint would have precluded the defendant seeking any meaningful employment in the 
computer retailing or servicing industry. The onus lay on Axon to prove that the restraint 
was reasonable and in the interests of both parties and the public. In this respect the 
restraint was unreasonable and substantially altered the bargain between the parties. No 
order could be made to vary the contract under the Illegal Contracts Act 1970 as the 
Court was not satisfied that such modification was appropriate. 
4 Ability to Earn a Living 
New Zealand courts are reluctant to enforce a clause if it will render an employee idle or 
unable to earn a living.
65 To this limited extent courts are prepared to recognise the 
public interest in freedom to work. In LEP International v Hass the defendant could not 
seek employment in the New Zealand shipping forwarding industry for a year after he left 
LEP. 66 A confidentiality clause in the contract prohibited him using LEP information for 
twelve months after the expiration of the contract. The defendant left the country, but 
returned and commenced employment with a trade competitor. The Court held that only 
63 General Bi I/posting v Atkinson [ 1909] AC 118. 
64 (1994] 1 ERNZ 312 . 
65 Ogi/vy & Mather v Darroch [ 1993] 2 ERNZ 58. 
66 (1987] 2 TCLR 615. 
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in an obvious case would it deprive a person of their means of support, particularly 
where the person is an immigrant on a conditional work permit. 
5 Duration, Area, Scope 
The duration, area and scope of the restraint are also relevant considerations for the 
Court. These three factors are traditional concerns and derive from the historical origins 
of the doctrine. During times when there was a shortage of labour it was of prime 
importance that labour mobility was retained. These factors must not be any wider than 
is necessary to protect the employer' s interests. This requires a fact specific inquiry in 
each case. The length of the employment relationship is relevant. The duration of the 
restraint in relation to the time remaining until the contract expires is also an important 
factor. 67 Some jurisdictions have specified what constitutes a valid temporal restriction. 
In Georgia there is a rebuttable presumption that a two year period of restraint is valid. 
68 
A restraint was reduced by the Employment Court in MA Watson Electrical Ltd v 
Kelling, because it was deemed unreasonable to exclude the defendant from Auckland 
central which is the largest market in New Zealand.
69 The restrictive covenant provided 
that the defendant could not operate in opposition to the plaintiff within a 15 kilometre 
radius, for two years after the termination of employment. The clause prohibited the 
defendant soliciting the plaintiff's past or existing clients. The defendant did this and as a 
result the plaintiff issued injunction proceedings. The Court found the covenant 
provisions unreasonable and unenforceable. The temporal restriction was too long and 
the geographical area too broad. The existence of a provision in the covenant allowing 
the defendant to apply for a release from the terms did not make the restraint reasonable. 
The Court was not persuaded to exercise discretion under section 8 Illegal Contracts 
Act. No consideration had been given for the deed of covenant, which was created 
67Above n 57. 
68 See GA Code Ann. Ss 13-8-2.1 ff 
69 Above n 54. 
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during the employment relationship. Equity will not enforce a restrictive covenant unless 
good consideration is given. In Medic Corp Ltd v Barrett it was considered unlikely that 
a restriction applicable to "New Zealand" would be reasonable. 
70 The scope of the 
restraint must not be any broader than the employer can justify. 
DB Breweries v Marshall concerned issues relating to restrictive covenants, the implied 
duty <?f fidelity, confidentiality, garden leave and issues relating to freedom of 
occupation. 7
1 The defendant was a sales representative for DB Breweries. His 
employment contract stipulated that one month's notice be given and expressly 
prohibited the disclosure of confidential information during and after the period of 
employment. A restrictive covenant restrained the defendant from seeking employment in 
the New Zealand liquor industry for three months. The scope of the restraint clause in 
DB v Marshall was wide.
72 The term "engagement in the liquor industry in New 
Zealand" encompassed a wide range of commercial activities that may have no 
connection with the activities carried out by DB. The restraint applied to an indefinite 
range of people. DB sought an injunction preventing the defendant from commencing 
employment with Lion and alleged the tort of inducement to breach of contract. The 
Employment Court suggested that the restraint be modified to prevent the defendant 
from dealing with DB's actual customers. Such a restriction is a sensible one. DB cannot 
legitimately claim to protect non existent client contacts (notional future competition). 
Dillon v Chep Handling Systems is a recent example of the way in which the 
Employment Court is approaching restrictive covenants. Justice Finnigan stated that 
restraints are acceptable if they are reasonable in their own context. 
73 This involves 
weighing the value of protecting the propriety interest, against the interest of the 
employee in protecting their freedom to contract. The Court objectively surveys what is 
70 [1992] 2 ERNZ 1048. 
71 Above n 45. 
72Above n 45 . 
73 [1995] 2 ERNZ 282. 
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reasonable in all the circumstances of the case and asks what is actually required. Chep 
Holdings sought to enforce a covenant that would prevent the divulgation of specialised 
and individual knowledge of market expansion strategy and the knowledge of customer 
needs. The judge partially rejected the employer' s argument on the basis that contractual 
terms relating to the implied duty of confidentiality and the conflict of interest clauses 
were sufficient to deal with the perceived problem.
74 The plaintiff and the company that 
sought to employ him provided a specific guarantee that they would not use any of the 
confidential information gained during Mr Dillon's employment with Chep. The restraint 
clause was wider than was necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests. The 
restraint purported to last for twelve months and had a potential worldwide application 
in respect of any potential employer who had operations in Auckland. The Court was not 
convinced that it would be an appropriate or adequate solution to vary the clause 
pursuant to the Illegal Contracts Act 1970. The Court did not consider that the employer 
had provided sufficient consideration for the restraint clause. No real attempt at 
reasonableness had been made. 
6 Other Means of Protecting Business 
New Zealand analysis of restrictive covenants underrates the merit of an inquiry into 
whether the employer has other means of protecting its business interest. The 
Employment Court in the DB case made the obiter observation that the restraint was 
intended to prevent unfair competition, which is a legitimate aim of such covenants. 
75 
However, the Court gave little credit to the fact that there was an independent clause in 
the contract restricting the use of confidential information beyond the termination of 
employment. If an interest is already protected, it should not be further entrenched by a 
restrictive covenant. In the DB case no evidence was adduced to indicate that the 
defendant would breach the duty of confidentiality. Lion had testified that the company 
74Above n 73 , at 30 l and 303. 
75 Unfair competition meaning the employee making unfair use of information or contacts gained in the 
course of employment. 
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would ensure that there was no breach of the covenant. Courts should pay more 
attention to analysing whether the restraint is necessary. The writer suggests that if there 
are less disruptive means of protecting an interest they should be used. 
B Anatomy of an Analysis 
In Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Nielsen the Court undertakes a 
comprehensive analysis of the relevant considerations in restraint of trade. In some areas 
the approach is forward thinking, particularly the requirement that there be significant 
client contact. 76 BCNZ sought an injunction restraining Nielsen from entering into 
employment with a trade competitor, Radio Avon. 
77 For six months Nielsen could not 
engage in broadcasting for any other organisation in a 100 km radius of the Christchurch 
Central Post Office. This condition could be discharged with written consent and would 
not apply ifBCNZ terminated the defendant's contract of employment for any reason not 
provided for in the employment contract. Courts are more likely to uphold the validity of 
a restraint of trade clause if the clause does not apply in the event of the covenantor 
terminating the employment contract. There was a covenant to maintain confidentiality 
during and after employment. 
BCNZ had to establish that the clause was necessary to protect an identifiable 
proprietary interest. The covenant could not be unreasonable from the point of view of 
the employee and should not conflict with the interests of the public. The defendant was 
an intelligent businessman who understood the effect of the covenant. The Court 
assessed the reasonableness of the clause and the degree of contact the defendant had 
with the plaintiff's customers. 
78 The whole course of the employment relationship was 
taken into account. 
79 This required an analysis of the nature of the employer's business 
76 See section on potential developments. 
n Unreported,, 26 February 1988, CP 484/87. 
78 See above n 49 and discussion below at p 56 for a discussion of client contact. 
79 H&R Block Ltd v Sannot [1976) I NZLR 213,219 
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and the employee' s role in the business. The responsibilities undertaken by the employee 
and the opportunities afforded to the employee were considered. 
Thus I consider that the issue of reasonableness is to be judged in light of all the circumstances, 
both at the time the contract was entered into, and during the course of the employment.
80 
The broadcasting industry is highly competitive and depends on the results of its 
audience surveys for advertising revenue. Radio stations try to protect their relationships 
with regular advertisers. This was the business interest that BCNZ wanted to protect. 
Nielsen was the programme director of the station and was responsible for the quality 
control of the advertising. He was involved with promotional campaigns initiated by 
advertisers, although on the evidence before the Court, it appears that this was a small 
percentage of the total advertising business. Justice Hardie Boys observed: 
The employer' s interest in maintaining his trade connection does not entitle him to obtain 
protection against every employee who deals with his customers, but only against those who 
because of the nature of their employment are likely to have personal knowledge of or influence 
over the customers and hence over where they place their custom to such an extent that it is 
within their power to entice them away.
81 
In requiring that the employee must have had personal knowledge or influence over 
clients the judge verged on applying a test that requires significant client contact before a 
restraint is deemed reasonable. This is a sensible distinction which safeguards the public 
interest. The judge concluded that the covenant was not justified on the grounds of the 
position that the defendant held. The degree of personal contact with company 
customers was not such as to enable him to entice customers to transfer their business 
elsewhere. 
80 Above n77, at 17. 
8 1 Above n 77, at 19. 
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BCNZ's claim based on trade secrets fared better. Whether information could be classed 
as confidential, depends on all the circumstances and the nature of the employment. The 
nature of the information and whether or not the employer has impressed on the 
employee the confidentiality of the information is an important factor. 
82 The plaintiff 
alleged four categories of confidential information; information concerning staff details, 
station budgets, planned promotions and attitudinal surveys. Confidential information 
was regularly handled by Nielsen and this imposed on him a high obligation of 
confidentiality. The latter three categories of information were deemed confidential. The 
judge was concerned about the possible effect that disclosure would have on the market 
research and attitudinal surveys and directed that the restraint should apply well past the 
completion of the surveys. 
The geographical extent of the restraint was not challenged but objection to the duration 
was noted. Justice Hardie Boys directed that the defendant should be restrained from 
commencing employment with Radio Avon for six months after his resignation. Nielsen 
gave an express undertaking that he would not breach the duty of confidentiality. This 
was accepted by the plaintiff 
The Nielsen case is an example of a comprehensive approach of the Court of Appeal to 
restrictive covenants. The Court makes an effort to weigh each relevant element in the 
case in order to effect a balance for the purposes of deciding whether or not to grant an 
injunction. The main fault with the analysis is that the Court did not consider other ways 
of protecting the information. Nielsen had already given the Court an express 
undertaking that he would not use the confidential information. The approach taken 
proceeds on the basis that the employee will misuse the information. The role of 
undertakings should be expanded. 
82 Al/co Agencies Auckland Ltd v Naidoo & Anor Unreported, Auckland, 12 October 1987, A 1214/85. 
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C Nadir 
Jn Marine Helicopters Ltd v Stevenson the Employment Court lost direction in its 
approach to restraint of trade. 
83 This judgment emphasises irrelevant considerations. 
Justice Finnigan seems more concerned with protecting the plaintiff's investment in the 
defendant's training than with the traditional analysis of the restraint of trade doctrine. 
The company was less concerned with identifying an asset that it wanted to protect than 
it was with restraining competition in an area in which they previously had dominance. 
The defendant and his father were employed as pilots for Marine Helicopters Ltd. 
Stevenson and enjoyed considerable personal following as a result of their longstanding 
association with the area and exemplary work record. 
84 Affidavit evidence indicated that 
the majority of Marine Helicopters former clients preferred the services of Mr Stevenson. 
He was the sole reason why they had done business with Marine Helicopters. After 
resigning, the defendant gained employment with another helicopter line. Two months 
later he was offered contract work piloting for Carter Holt, a firm with which Marine 
Helicopters considered it had an established business arrangement. Marine Helicopters 
was concerned that the plaintiff was poaching its clients and sought to enforce a 
restrictive covenant contained in the original written contract of employment. The issue 
was complicated by the fact that the written employment contract was never signed by 
the defendant and the employment relationship proceeded on the basis of established 
practice. The judge determined that the contract was oral but the terms were evidenced 
by the original, unsigned contract in the defendant's possession. The restrictive covenant 
purported to restrain the defendant from being employed as a helicopter pilot for any 
company or organisation in the area, or for the former customers of Marine Helicopters. 
The defendant was bonded to Marine Helicopters for five years to enable the firm to 
recoup the cost of training the defendant. Justice Finnigan rejected counsel for the 
83Above n I. 
84 Above n 46, in Radio Horowhenua the plaintiff could not seek to monopolise the personal following of the 
employee. 
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defendant's submission that one of the aims of the covenant was to protect the 
company's investment in training the pilots.
85 The judge correctly stated that this was 
more appropriately protected by the five year bond that binds trainee pilots. The judge 
agreed that prevention of competition is not a legitimate aim of restrictive covenants. 
However in spite of Justice Finnigan' s earlier protestations, he confused the distinction 
between the role of the bond and the restrictive covenant. He stated: 
Having trained Mr Stevenson from the commencement of his helicopter pilot training to the 
point where he was a superbly trained and very skilful helicopter operator, and having done so for 
the sole purpose of building up its own business in his local area, it acted reasonably in requiring 
Mr Stevenson, from the outset and before their relationship commenced, to agree that he would 
not work for persons who had hitherto been its (ie. his) customers for a period of two years after 
ceasing to work as its employee. 86 
This paragraph indicates an intention to protect the former employer so as to enable him 
to recoup the investment in the defendant's training. This is reinforced by Justice 
Finnigan's justification for allowing two year restraint period. The pilot who replaced Mr 
Stevenson did not have the personal reputation that the defendant possessed. The new 
pilot did not have the same level of experience and flying skill .
87 The judge reasoned that 
this meant that : 
To have Mr Stevenson available and flying with any available operator during that time negates 
the plaintiff's right to reasonable protection. 
88 
Even assuming that Marine Helicopters was legitimately trying to protect the goodwill in 
the company there are still problems with the judge' s assessment of the merits of the 
case. This writer submits that the judge is aiming to guard against legitimate competition. 
85 Above n I, at p 11. 
86 Above nl , at p 14. 
87 Abovenl , atp 15. 
88 Above n I , at p 15 . 
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The fact that Marine Helicopters hired a less able and less popular pilot is not reason to 
extend the period of a restrictive covenant. There are very good policy reasons why this 
should not be the case. If skilled helicopter pilots are hard to come by this is an even 
better reason why there should be a limited period of restraint, if there is to be one at all. 
The one redeeming feature of the case is that Justice Finnigan did not grant an injunction. 
A declaration was issued to the effect that the clause was valid and time was left for 
submissions to be made to the Court and the quantum of damages to be assessed. The 
former employer was not seeking to enforce the restraint in respect of the majority of 
clients who had followed the defendant. He only sought to enforce it in respect of the 
contract work being done for Carter Holt Harvey. 
Marine Helicopters represents a dangerous development in the Employment Court ' s 
approach to restrictive covenants. The result in the case was not too harsh, but it sets a 
dangerous precedent. The fundamentals of the doctrine of restraint of trade have been 
studiously ignored. Judicial willingness to grant the employer a monopoly on the 
employees skills should be severely scrutinised. 
V Other Developments 
A Garden Leave 
Garden leave is increasingly common in managerial positions in industries, where the rate 
of technological advance means that information is rapidly outdated. Garden leave 
provides the employee with a protracted period of leave during which they are paid as 
usual, but not required to work. At the same time, the employee may not seek 
employment in a related area. 89 Garden leave will become more common because both 
the Employment Court and the High Court are lenient in their approach towards it. 
89 See above n 54. 
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Employers worried about the uncertainties associated w
ith the courts' approaches to 
restrictive covenants may consider garden leave an accep
table compromise. On the face 
of it garden leave may seem to be an agreeable option.
 However, where the duration 
exceeds six months it can operate as an insidious 
form of restraint. Skills and 
marketability are quickly lost in many industries today. 
The employee in Rank Xerox New Zealand Ltd v U-Bix C
opiers (NZ) Ltd and Morton 
had given notice and was paid but not required to wo
rk. 90 Morton claimed that the 
employer had breached an implied term of the employm
ent contract that the employer 
shall provide work. The employee repudiated his cont
ract on this basis. The High 
Court's view was that 
[i]t was reasonable for the plaintiff to withhold work from
 him provided it was prepared to keep 
on paying him.
91 
Factors such as the duration and area of the restraint in 
the case favoured the plaintiff. 
An injunction was not granted against the first defendant as th
ere was no evidence that 
Ubix had sought confidential information from the se
cond defendant. From this it 
followed that there was no evidence of a serious ques
tion to be tried. However an 
injunction was granted against the second defendant prev
enting him from working until 
the end of the period of restraint. 
The restrictive covenant in McHerron v Ceramco Corpor
ation 92 prevented the former 
employee from working in a range of capacities, for the duratio
n of the garden leave, and 
for one year afterwards. 
93 The plaintiff sought declaratory relief against the provisio
ns. 
The Court approved of the plaintiffs course of conduct in
 seeking the relief 
94 Implicit in 
90 Unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, 20 Decemb
er 1985, A 1407 /85. 
91Above n 49, at 11 . 
92 [1994) 2 ERNZ 586. 
93 From 29 April 1994 until 31 March 1995 at which time
 the restrictive covenant would become operative. 
94 Above n 92 , at 590. 
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the Court's approval is a condemnation of the practice of igno
ring restrictive covenants 
and commencing employment elsewhere. 
Chief Justice Goddard in Radio Horowhenua suggested that 
payment may negate a 
finding that a restrictive covenant is unreasonable, since the ha
rdship to the employee is 
alleviated. 
95 Hardship, however is only one of the factors to be considered 
by the Court 
in assessing the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant. P
aying employees for not 
working restricts their freedom to work but operates so as to 
mitigate the harshness of 
the effect. Garden leave is viewed by employers as an effe
ctive means of sanitising 
former employees. In practice garden leave has an effect ve
ry similar to a restrictive 
covenant, the payment of consideration is the only real 
difference. Garden leave 
provisions can hinder career continuity and development. Long
 periods of absence from 
a quickly changing industry can result in the employee 
being a less marketable 
proposition for potential employers. This impacts on their futu
re employment prospects. 
Because there is consideration given for the arrangement, b
oth the High Court and 
Employment Court are more reluctant to intervene than in the c
ase of a simple restrictive 
covenant. It is important that this trend should be carefully sc
rutinised lest the duration 
of the restriction should last so long that it unduly interferes wi
th the career development 
of employees. 
B Employer Agreements Not to Hire 
A potentially dangerous extension of the implied duty is emp
loyer collusion, whereby 
employers agree not to employ each other's staff This operate
s as a de facto ceiling on 
the level of wages payable. Workers would not be denied the 
right to earn a living, and 
future courts might be more willing to uphold the validity of such r
estraints, especially if 
under pressure from the business community. This occurs regu
larly in the sports world 
where the transfer system operates as a restraint on players' f
reedom to choose whom 
95 Above n 46 , at 1096. 
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they will play for.
96 The rules operate on several levels. They prevent the pla
yer 
negotiating and contracting to play for a team of their choic
e. Restrictions on player 
transfers bind the player to a club for an indefinite period durin
g which they may not be 
remunerated. In Blackler v New Zealand Rugby Football Leagu
e (Inc) the New Zealand 
court refused to allow the NZRFU to refuse to grant Blac
kler clearance to play in 
Australia.
97 Salary caps instigated by clubs create a ceiling for payment of p
layers. Where 
there exists an involuntary restraint the courts should be more h
esitant to assume that the 
restraint is reasonable. The Court should consider the inequali
ty of bargaining positions 
between the players and the clubs. Lord Diplock in A Schroed
er Music Publishing Co 
Ltd v Macaulay stated that restraint of trade is about: 
the protection of those whose bargaining power is weak aga
inst being forced by those whose 
bargaining power is stronger to enter into bargains that are unco
nscionable. 
98 
With the increase in popularity of Rugby League and the high p
rices being negotiated by 
players it may be that there will be a move away from an a
utomatic presumption of 
inequality of bargaining power. Additionally, if the practise had
 the effect of substantially 
lessening competition in a market, it would fall within s 28 of th
e Commerce Act. 
VI Restraints on Non-Work Activities 
A Implied Duties 
In recent years employers have tried to monopolise employees' 
skills by claiming that the 
use of the employee's skills to the benefit of anyone but the
 employer, constitutes a 
breach of the implied terms of fidelity or confidentiality. This en
ables the employer to do 
96 For a discussion of the operation ofrestraint of trade in sport se
e A Humphreys "Sport, Restraint of Trade 
and the Australian Courts" 15 Sydney Law Review 92. 
97 [1968] NZLR 547. 
98 [1974] I WLR 1308, at 1315. 
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that which it would not otherwise be able to do within the traditiona
l rubric of restraint 
of trade. The implied duties are used in a number of ways, to 
prevent secondary 
employment, and as justification for dismissal on the basis of persona
l relationships, and 
to act as a ceiling on wages. 
Implied duties represent a quagmire of legal uncertainty for the emp
loyee. The implied 
duties operate during the employment relationship, while restraint of t
rade operates when 
the employment relationship has ended. The duty comprises a
 duty of fidelity, 
confidentiality and an obligation not to do anything that might unde
rmine the trust and 
confidence in the employment relationship. The duties are sketchily 
defined and expand 
incrementally. The lack of certainty leads to the employer defining th
e duty as widely as 
possible. In construing the terms so widely the Court can sometim
es ignore the basic 
legal principles relating to restraint of trade. The requirement that the
re be an identifiable 
asset to protect and the fact that there are other means of protecti
on available to the 
employer often go unnoticed. 
An employee may not do anything that betrays the duty of fidelity that he
 or she owes 
the employer. The American Restatement (First) of Contracts define
s such a duty as a 
vertical restraint of trade. According to Petrofina, a restraint of tr
ade consists of an 
employee agreeing any time after the formation of the contract, to res
trict their liberty to 
trade in the future . 
99 The duties become more confused where an employee gains 
secondary employment. There is no absolute rule preventing an empl
oyee from working 
for someone else during their spare time. To prevent this the employ
er has to show the 
existence of harmful competition inconsistent with the duty of good 
faith . 1
0° Courts will 
not imply a restrictive covenant, it must be specifically stated. Second
ary employment is 
not subject to the doctrine of restraint of trade. The clause does not 
take away a liberty 
that the employee would otherwise have had. An employee cannot contra
ct out of the 
duty of fidelity. The duty is breached if your spare time activities a
dversely affect the 
99Petrofina (GB) Ltd v Martin [1 966] Ch 146. 
'
00 Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Jnstn,ments Ltd [ 1946] Ch 169. 
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employer's interests. According to the traditional analysis if yo
ur secondary employment 
is similar in nature to your full time employment this cou
ld constitute a breach of 
fidelity.
101 An employee must serve their employer with the utmost faith
 and fidelity.
102 
Conduct that the ordinary person would regard as dishonest 
is prohibited. The implied 
duty of confidentiality exists independently of a restrictive c
ovenant and survives the 
employment relationship. 
I Confidential Information 
Many contracts contain prov1s1ons relating to issues o
f confidentiality. Target 
Recruitment Services v Lewin involved both restraint of trade 
and confidentiality issues. 
Target consultancy agency requested staff to sign an agreem
ent not to disclose or use 
information in such a way that would cause loss or injury to 
Target. 103
 The prohibition 
operated during employment and for twelve months afterw
ards. It was limited to 
competition in a specific area. The defendant's employment was term
inated and within 
two months he began working with a competitor in defiance of the re
strictive covenant. 
Confidential information had been acquired in the course of em
ployment. This was within 
the scope of the restraint. The duration of the restraint was con
sidered excessive and was 
reduced. The Court commented that a person should not be de
nied the subsequent use of 
skills acquired during the course of employment, even if 
those skills may assist a 
competitor.
104 An employer could however impose a restraint to protect a
n identified 
proprietary interest. 
105 
101 Above n 63. 
102 Schilling v Kidd-Gan·ett Ltd [ 1977] 1 NZLR 243 . 
103f1987] 2 TCLR 391. 
104 Compare this with Judge Finnigan' s analysis in Marine Helico
pters above n 1. 
105 Stenhouse Australia Ltd v Phillips [ 1974] AC 391 
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2 Undermining the Employer's Authority 
The employee has a duty not to do anything that w
ould undermine the trust and 
confidence in the employment relationship. Great emp
hasis has been placed on this 
concept by employers, as it can be interpreted to mean a
lmost anything. In Bridge v Big 
Save Furniture Ltd 
106 the plaintiff obtained a lease to commence his own busi
ness and 
approached potential suppliers, but did not attempt
 to persuade the supplier to 
discontinue supplying the defendant. The Tribunal hel
d that the plaintiff's actions in 
approaching the suppliers had the potential for creating
 a rumour about the employer. 
Bridge owed a duty of good faith and loyalty to th
e employer which was being 
undermined by the plaintiff's actions. The defendant was 
held to be justified in summarily 
dismissing the plaintiff for undermining the employment
 relationship. The Employment 
Court reversed the Tribunal's decision and held that th
e employee had not engaged in 
dishonest conduct. Goddard CJ referred to Schilling v Kid
d Garrett Ltd and stated that 
the test for "fraudulently undermining" the employment
 relationship was too narrow a 
test of the employee's intentions.
107 He stated what he believed an employee may not do : 
What the employee may not do is act against the interest
s of the employer by devoting himself in 
time paid for by the employer - otherwise than incidenta
lly - to the pursuit of his own interests, 
or, while still employed by the employer, pursuing comm
ercial advantage at the expense (usually 
meaning to the exclusion) of the employer. 
The Court of Appeal said that dishonesty was not a preco
ndition for finding that the duty 
of fidelity had been breached. The breach occurred wh
en the employee's intention to 
leave was made known to the suppliers and staff: but n
ot to the employer. This test is 
lower than that of the Employment Court and encompass
es a wide range of conduct. It is 
unimaginable that an employer planning to retrench emp
loyees would be under a similar 
duty to let staff know before other people such as the sol
icitor or accountant. 
106 
[ 1993] 2 ERNZ 201. 
107 fl 977] I NZLR 243 . 
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If an employee induces customers to leave the employer for the em
ployee's advantage 
this amounts to misconduct. In Compass Union of New Zealand L
td v J<oodstufjs 
Auckland Ltd the employee undertook private accounting work for 
customers of his 
employer. 
108 The employee claimed that he was unjustifiably dismissed. The di
smissal 
was procedurally unfair but the Court refused to award dama
ges because of the 
misconduct. In Davis Trading Co Ltd v Lewis the nature of the work w
as of importance 
in deciding whether the conduct involves a breach of duty. 
109 
The traditional approach to an employee's spare time activities is th
at employees are free to use 
their spare time as they see fit, unless there is a conflict of interest.
 The cases usually involve a 
clear threat of damage to the employer, hostile competition or bad fa
ith. Actual conflict is usually 
caused by the employee' s activities not just a mere apprehension of c
onflict. 
Conduct that is likely to undermine the employment relationship is 
now defined widely, 
and dishonest intent is not a prerequisite. The Court of Appeal Bridg
e test is moving 
towards an attempt to restrict an employee on the basis of appre
hension of conflict, 
rather than actual damage. This does not bode well for employees s
eeking to establish a 
business before they leave employment. Would listing the compan
y or seeking a bank 
loan be sufficient to undermine an employer' s authority? 
B Pillow Talk Cases 
An undesirable trend in New Zealand employment law is the "pillow t
alk" case. This 
consists of a real or imagined threat that an employee may p
ass on confidential 
information to an employee of a rival company because of the p
ersonal relationship 
between them. Employers have reacted to the perceived threat by sa
cking the (invariably 
female) employee. Discrimination on the basis of marital status i
s prohibited by the 
Human Rights Act 1993 . Employees who are married enjoy a bette
r level of protection. 
108 p 992] 3 ERNZ 16. 
109 [1993] 2 ERNZ 272. 
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In the other cases the women dismissed were not married to their 
partners. No argument 
was made by counsel in the case on the basis of sex discrim
ination. This is an option that 
the writer hopes will be utilised should similar cases arise in 
the future. 
In Northern Clerical Workers Union v Printpac UEB Ca
rton an employer was 
concerned that a female employee might pass on confidenti
al information to her partner 
who worked for a rival firm.
110 The employee's dismissal was held to be justified because 
of the possibility that she might pass on confidential 
information. Justice Travis 
considered that dismissal could be justified for good busines
s reasons, totally unrelated to 
the employee's conduct. The judge applied a United King
dom case which established 
that close relationships may justify dismissal . 
111 Justice Travis concluded from his survey 
of the authorities that, if the employer had reasonable grou
nds for suspecting that there 
was potential for information to be passed, dismissal could
 be justified. Mere access to 
information was sufficient. It is unclear from the case law what 
type of evidence the 
employer would have to present as justification. 
Meeuwsen v New Zealand Railway Co Ltd and Eggleston v Fire
stone Tyre & Rubber Co 
Ltd112 both involve women being dismissed from their em
ployment. The female 
employees were dismissed because of their relationship w
ith a person employed by a 
competing business. The employers alleged potential for co
nfidential information to be 
disclosed, even if inadvertently. In Meeuwsen the Court a
ccepted the employer's 
assessment of risk and held that the dismissal was justified. 
It is arguable that the Court 
did not exercise procedural fairness . 
113 In Eggleston the dismissal was found to be 
unjustified because the dismissal was founded on the marita
l status of the employee. An 
evidential basis for the perceived risk was required. The is
sue of sexual discrimination 
was never raised in relation to these cases The Eggleston approach
 is preferable but 
should be extended to provide protection for de facto coupl
es. Otherwise the law would 
110 [1989]2 NZILR 644. 
111 Skyrail Oceanic Ltd v Coleman (1980] IRLR 226. 
11 2 Umeported judgments, AT 212/93, and CT 119/ 93 re~-pectivel
y. 
113 The Court did not test the validity of the employer's allegation
, but just accepted it as true. 
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operate so as to put unmarried couples at a palpable disadvantage. T
he substantiality of 
the risk should be assessed and principles of procedural fairness applie
d. 
C Seco11dary Employme11t 
An area which is cause for concern is the development of restraints 
on secondary 
employment. An increasing number of people are relying on a combination
 of part time 
jobs. Women tend to be over represented in this category of wor
k. Difficulties arise 
because the employer frequently fails to identify the interest the
y seek to protect. 
Communications & Energy Workers Union v Tisco is perhaps the b
est known of the 
cases involving implied duties of confidentiality and fidelity. 
114 Tisco' s employment 
contract provided that the pursuit of electronic trade practises for
 monetary reward 
without the knowledge and consent of the company was strictly forbi
dden . An employee 
of Tisco's repaired and sold old televisions in his spare time. Tisco 
objected to this on 
the grounds that the employee used spare parts bought at a staff 
discount and other 
retailers had complained to Tisco that it might lead to a drop in new televisio
n sales. The 
plaintiff could not claim that there was any direct competition. 
The employer was 
claiming an exclusive right to the employee's skills. The Court of
 Appeal judgement 
defined this by saying that it comprised the mutual trust and 
confidence in the 
employment relationship. 
[a]ny conduct by an employee which is likely to damage the employe
r' s business, for example by 
impairing its goodwill, or to undermine significantly the trust which
 the employer is entitled to 
place in the employee, could constitute a breach of duty. 
11 5 
The Court of Appeal determination of Tisco Ltd v Communications &
 Energy Workers 
Union departed from the Employment Court approach. 
116 The Employment Court had 
11 4 [1992] 2 ERNZ 1087. 
115 [1993] 2 ERNZ 779, at 782. 
116Aboven 115. 
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analysed the issues according to the restraint of trade doctrine, which theoretically 
requires a balancing of interests. 117 The Employment Court held that there was no 
attempt to injure the employer's interests so the duty of fidelity was not breached. The 
Court of Appeal considered that any conduct likely to damage the employer's business 
by impairing the goodwill or undermining the implied duty of trust would constitute a 
breach. Such conduct is unspecified and is left for the Court to define on a case by case 
basis. This results in a substantial extension to the duties and obligations in the employer 
employee relationship. A more equitable result would be reached if public policy 
considerations were taken into account. 
1 The Tisco Aftermath 
If a checkout employee at Kmart works fifteen hours a week, and ten hours a week as a 
shop assistant at a retail store, would it be reasonable to prevent her from working one 
of the jobs because of a possible breach of the duty of fidelity? If so, then which job 
would take priority, the job she was first employed in or the job that she works more 
hours in? Would the duty still apply if the jobs although both in the retail sector were 
substantially different? Many of these questions remain unanswered by the Tisco 
decision. 
The defendant in Tisco was not acting in direct competition with the plaintiff company. 
The Court had found four factors constituting a breach of the implied duty of fidelity and 
confidentiality. 118 If an express term in the contract had prohibited secondary 
employment the employee would benefit because the Court would have analysed it in 
accordance with the restraint of trade doctrine. The clause would be prima facie void, 
117Above n 114. 
118 The abuse of staff purchasing concessions 
Profiting from the repair work 
The risk Uiat potential customers may purchase from the defendant and not Tisco 
The damage to Tisco's relations with other businesses. 
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subject to an assessment for reasonableness. If the clause prevented
 an employee from 
earning a living the courts would be more reluctant to enforce the cl
ause. Implied terms 
prevent the employee from taking on other employment if it in any w
ay jeopardises the 
implied duty of fidelity . This duty includes third party interests. 
The Court of Appeal Tisco decision has a potentially senous im
pact on the work 
conditions of part time workers, independent contractors and peo
ple who rely on a 
combination of jobs. Employees are substantially disadvantaged by 
the fluid scope of 
implied duties. A system of analysis should be devised that tak
es account of the 
employee's role in the organisation and the type of work that they 
are carrying out in 
their secondary employment. Employers should have to point to an i
nterest that is being 
damaged by the employee' s conduct, not to abstract or theoretical 
damage. The duty 
should only apply where the employee has real and substantial client
 contact and is in a 
position to influence the decision making process within the orga
nisation. The duty 
should in some way be proportional to the hours worked by the emplo
yee. 
2 A Return to a More Conservative Approach? 
More recently McKay Electrical (Whangarei) Ltd v Hinton dealt wit
h the implied terms 
of fidelity in the employment relationship. 
119 The fact situation is clearer than the Tisco 
decision. McKay Electrical, one of the leading electrical firms in the W
hangarei area was 
invited to submit a tender for work at Northland Health. Northlan
d Health was not 
satisfied with the tender and invited McKay Electrical ' s employee t
o tender. Hinton' s 
tender was accepted and he resigned. Counsel for the plaintiff argu
ed that it was not 
necessary to show dishonest intent in order to establish a case aga
inst the defendant. 
There could be a breach of fidelity without dishonesty. 
120 The employer was seeking to 
protect his legitimate existing business interests. The employee wa
s not undertaking 
secondary employment, but sought to supplant his employer' s se
rvices in a limited 
119 Unreported, Court of Appeal, 25 June 1996, CA 123/96. 
120 See Bridge v Big Save Fumiture [1994] 2 ERNZ 507, at 517. 
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market. The plaintiff did not attempt to restrict the futu
re employment prospects of the 
defendant. The defendant was not restrained from submi
tting tenders for any future work 
at the hospital. The writer can perceive less harm in the 
approach of the Court of Appeal 
than in the Tisco case. There was a clear conflict of in
terest and undermining of the 
employment relationship. The defendant remained free
 to pursue other contracts with 
Northland Health and so the damage suffered by him wa
s mitigated. 
In Tisco a strong obligation was placed on employees whe
re there is potential for conflict 
of interest. 
121 Competition per se is not what should be objected to, b
ut the abuse of the 
employment relationship. Tisco lacks a sense of proportion
ality and a method of analysis 
that enables employees to undertake secondary employ
ment without fear that they will 
be breaching the vaguely defined implied duties. 
VII Procedural Issues 
A Employment Court Jurisdiction 
Jurisdictional issues have haunted the Employment 
Court since its creation. The 
Employment Court has both concurrent and exclusive 
jurisdiction. Sections 104(1) (f), 
(g) and (h) set out the Court's jurisdiction. Section 
104( 1 )(f) grants jurisdiction to 
determine any matter connected with an employment co
ntract. Section 104( 1 )(g) grants 
the Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determ
ine any action based on an 
employment contract. Section 104( 1 )(h) provides jurisd
iction to grant any order that the 
High Court or District Court may make, in any proceedings 
that are founded on, or 
related to an employment contract. In Medic Corp Ltd v B
arrett counsel for the plaintiff 
suggested that the Employment Court did not have juris
diction to grant injunctions.
122 X 
v Y Ltd & NZ Stock Exchange reaffirmed that the Employme
nt Court has all the tools 
121 Above n 115. 
122 [1992) 2 ERNZ 1048, (HC). 
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that were possessed by previous jurisdictions.
123 All cases founded on an employment 
contract should, however be heard in the Employment C
ourt. 124
 Cooney v Welsh, a High 
Court decision should rightfully have been heard in the E
mployment Court . 
125 In Cooney 
a separate deed of restraint of trade was appended to
 the employment contract. The 
plaintiff sought relief from the terms of the deed. The C
ourt held that provided the deed 
was sufficiently isolated from the employment contrac
t, the Court could deal with the 
matters therein contained. The fundamental question is 
whether or not the deed and the 
employment contract are intimately connected. Medic C
orp v Barrett dealt with the 
issues of confidentiality and Employment Court jurisd
iction. 1
26 The question was thus 
framed : 
But is the breach of duty so closely interwoven with a br
each of an employment contract that it 
can be said that there is an action relating to an employme
nt contract? It is certainly referable to 
an employment contract. 
127 
B Modification 
1 New Zealand 
The modification provisions of the Employment Contra
cts Act are a major reason why 
employers seek to avoid the jurisdiction of the Employm
ent Court. It is difficult to obtain 
an order for modification if no attempt at reasonab
leness has been made. If this 
procedural hurdle is jumped the plaintiff the contract can
 be modified by the Employment 
Court. Modification is more extensive than the approa
ch of the High Court which is 
simply to strike out the elements of the contract that see
m most unreasonable. 
123 [I 992] I ERNZ 863 . 
124 S 3( I ) Employment Contracts Act. 
125 Above n 47. 
126 Above n 34. 
127 Above n 34, at 530. 
46 
The enforcement of restrictive covenants is governed
 by the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 and the Illegal Contracts Act 1970. Section 10
4( 1 )(h) Employment Contracts Act 
1991 grants the Employment Court the jurisdiction 
to make any order that the High 
Court of District Court may make. This means that th
e provisions of the Illegal Contracts 
Act apply. Section 104 (2) sets a double requireme
nt before the Court can modify a 
restrictive covenant. The Court must be satisfied beyo
nd reasonable doubt that: 
a) The order should be made 
b) That any other remedy would be inadequate or inap
propriate. 
The employer must prove these elements to the cri
minal standard of proof In Radio 
Horowhenua Goddard CJ remarked that the requisite
 standard to justify modification is 
higher than the requirement prior to 15 May 1991 .
128 
The Illegal Contracts Act provides: 
s 8 Restraints of trade-( l) Where any provision of
 any contract constitutes an unreasonable 
restraint of trade, the Court may-
(a) Delete the provision and give effect to the contract 
so amended; or 
(b) So modify the provision that at the time the c
ontract was entered into the provision so 
modified would have been reasonable, and give effect 
to the contract as so modified; or 
(c) Where the deletion or modification of the provisi
on would so alter the bargain between the 
parties that it would be unreasonable to allow the 
contract to stand, decline to enforce the 
prov1s1on 
The powers of modification contained in section 8(
l)(b) are wider than those of the 
common law doctrine of severance. 
129 Section 8( 1 )( c) implies that a clause can be 
modified unless it would substantially alter the bargain
 between the parties. 
Section 104 is only relevant if the court exercising jur
isdiction is the Employment Court. 
It is not applicable if either the High Court or District 
Court exercises jurisdiction. The 
128 The date that the Employment Contracts Act was intr
oduced. 
129 The clause need not consist of separate covenants and
 there are few limits on the type of modification that 
maybe made. 
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High Court approach proceeds on the basis that a restraint m
ay be modified unless there 
is a cogent reason not to do so .13° This approach how
ever may be based on an 
impressionistic reading of the Mason case. rn The appella
nt, notably titled Mason 
(Pauper), sought relief from a broadly drafted contract that p
rohibited vaguely similar for 
a three year period, within twenty five miles of London. Maso
n did say that a court may 
enforce a covenant even when taken as a whole it exc
eeds what is reasonable. 
132 
However, Lord Moulton qualified this by saying: 
It would in my opinion be pessimi exempli if, when an employ
er had extracted a covenant 
deliberately framed in unreasonably wide terms, the Courts w
ere to come to his assistance and, by 
applying their ingenuity and knowledge of the law, carve out
 of this void covenant the maximum 
of what he might validly have required.
133 
Employers prefer the approach of the High Court as it is easi
er to satisfy the Court that a 
modification should be made. It is unlikely that many emp
loyers would persuade the 
Employment Court to exercise jurisdiction to modify. H & R B
lock v Sannot and Cooney 
v Welsh affirmed that the High Court has a wide discretion to
 modify clauses. 
134 In MA 
Watson v Kelling Justice Smellie noted that a balanced, ca
reful judicial approach is 
needed to reach a fair and reasonable result.
135 The overall justice of the case should be 
considered in deciding whether to exercise the power to mod
ify. "Modify" means to vary 
or change the provisions of the contract. Therefore it is pos
sible that a clause could be 
made stricter. 
136 The power to modify should only arise where the re
straint is 
unreasonable. If a clause is unreasonable it seems hard to jus
tify increasing the restraint. 
In this writer' s opinion, clauses that make no attempt to b
e reasonable should not be 
130 See above n 79. 
131 See above n 19. 
132 See above n 19, at 745, where Lord Moulton stated that sever
ance should only be done where the part 
was severable and only \\11.ere the excess was of trivial import
ance or was merely teclmical. 
133Above n 19, at 745 . 
134 Above n 79, and above n 47. 
135 Above n 54. 
136 Above n 47. 
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modified . 
137 This is also borne out by the dicta in the Mason case. If the ov
erall effect of 
the clause is unreasonable it should not be modified. Dillo
n v Chep is a step in the right 
direction for the High Court. The judge commented that 
a reason why the clause should 
not be modified was because the employer had made n
o attempt at reasonableness in 
drafting the terms of the covenant. The Employment Cou
rt standard of proof required to 
enable modification is high. If a clause is not modified it wil
l be struck out. For this 
reason many employers seek to have their cases brough
t before the District Court or 
High Court . The plaintiff in the DB case barely managed to 
establish an arguable case 
that the Court would be satisfied beyond reasonable dou
bt that modification should be 
made. If the contract could be modified and allowed to stand, th
ere would be an arguable 
case that Lion was party to the breach of contract. Li
on took a commercial risk by 
employing the defendant in full knowledge of the restric
tive covenant. This factor was 
balanced against the potential hardship to the defendant. T
he balance of convenience and 
justice favoured DB. The defendant had proceeded in 
spite of the restraint of trade 
clause, hoping that DB would not seek to enforce it. T
he Court disapproved of this 
course of action. 
[l]t can hardly be said that equity should favour such an 
approach when there exists a viable, 
lawful, and measured means of challenging an agreed
 contractual term that now appears 
inconvenient or unreasonable.
138 
If the Court cannot be persuaded to modify the clause it will be
 struck out. The fact that 
there are still jurisdictional debates means that as th
e law stands with regard to 
modification of provisions, the employer will always favou
r the High Court. 
137 Aboven 19at 745-746. 
138 Above n 45 , p 11. 
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2 American State Approaches to Modification 
Problems relating to modification are not unknown in other jurisdictions. The State of 
Ohio used to operate a bright line test for the assessment of restrictive covenants. Since 
then Ohio law has refined the principles oflaw in Briggs v Butler.
139 
Covenants must be 
reasonable, protect a legitimate business interest of the employer, not be unduly harsh on 
the employee and be in the public interest. Clauses were interpreted by the Court in such 
a way that they were either valid, or unreasonable and consequently invalid. This 
approach was refined in Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland Inc v Witter. 
140 
The 
main point was that there was no longer to be a bright line test applied to analysis of 
restrictive covenants. The Arthur Murray test has been accepted by over fourteen states 
as the correct test to adopt for the analysis of the reasonableness of covenants. 
141 
The Court in Extine severed the covenant into four parts.
142 
Severability allowed some 
elements of the covenant to be retained whilst striking out the more unreasonable ones. 
The doctrine of severance led the State of Ohio towards a regime that favours the 
employer. An extreme example of this was the Court upholding the validity of an 
eighteen month restriction encompassing forty-five states. 
143 
By 1977 the Court was able 
to rewrite portions of the contract that it felt were unreasonable. The Court expressed its 
view that: 
a covenant not to compete which imposes unreasonable restriction on an employee will be 
enforced to the extent necessary to protect an employer' s legitimate interests.
144 
This indicates a presumption in favour of the employer and presumes nefarious intent on 
the part of the employee. This gives scope for employers to draft wide clauses as there is 
139 Above n 26. 
140 105 NE 2d 685 (I 952). 
141 See B.D. Pynnonen "Post Employment Covenants" 55(1) Ohio State Journal 215, at 220. 
142 See above n 28. 
143 Patterson Jntemational Corp v Herrin 264 NE 2d 361 ( 1970). 
144 Above n 28, at 547. 
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no longer the fear that the covenant will be struck down for unreason
ableness. The Court 
refuses to enforce the most unreasonable clauses and allows the r
emaining clauses to 
stand. In Raimonde v Van Vlerah the court decided that injunctive rel
ief should run from 
the time of the judgment not from the end of the employment relatio
nship. 14
5This was a 
reaction to the delay in fixing a court hearing. ln many cases, the pe
riod of restraint had 
already run out by the time a fixture was gained.
146 The law relating to restrictive 
covenants in Ohio uncertain geographical restraints vary greatly, an
d the assessment of 
the validity of duration is also variable. It can be argued that this is
 the very approach 
that the Court desired to achieve when it departed from the bright lin
e test. 
The development of the law in Ohio is pertinent to New Zealand. 
There is increasing 
uncertainty as to how the courts will assess covenants. Compounding
 this is the problem 
of concurrent jurisdiction. The High Court and Court of Appeal 
in effect apply the 
doctrine of severance. The Employment Court can undertake to modi
fy the contract. The 
New Zealand Employment Court has an advantage in that it requires
 a high threshold to 
be satisfied before a covenant can be modified. This may act as a buf
fer against potential 
excesses. It is probably fair to say that it is true that if employers fee
l that they can draft 
what they will and then rely on the Court to sever or modify the co
venant, there is less 
incentive to draft fair clauses. 
C Injunctive Relief 
Injunctive relief reinforces the problems in the courts' assessm
ent of restrictive 
covenants. Where a decision to uphold the validity of covenant or to 
modify the restraint 
has been made, an injunction will cement the provisions of the c
ovenant. The High 
Court, and now it seems the Employment Court also take a vari
ed approach to the 
assessment of the reasonableness of restrictive covenants. Thes
e uncertainties are 
reflected in the limb of assessment that requires the Court to look at t
he overall justice of 
145 325 NE 2d 544 (1975). 
146 In New Zealand, delays in the Court system are endemic. 
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the case in determining whether to grant the injunction or not. Courts should always bear 
in mind that granting the injunction may act as a de facto determination of the case. 
Injunctive relief requires a four pronged analysis: 
1 . Determining where the threshold in the case is. 
147 
2. Ascertaining where the balance of convenience lies. 
3. Calculating damages. 
4. Determining the overall justice of the case. 
1 Threshold 
The American Cyanamid approach asks if there is a serious question to be tried. This 
was modified in Armourguard Security where it was said that a prima facie case had to 
be made out. In DB Breweries the requirement was that an "arguable or serious case" be 
shown.148 The prima facie test is on the whole preferable to the "arguable or serious 
case" test . As the latter test would effectively decide the case at the interim injunction 
stage.149 
2 Balance of Convenience 
In assessmg the balance of convenience, the Court considers the damage that the 
business will suffer if the injunction is not granted. This is balanced against the injury the 
employee will suffer if the injunction is granted. Given the length of time before most 
hearings, a case is frequently decided at the interim injunction stage anyway. This de 
facto determination should be borne in mind when effecting the balancing process. An 
employee is placed at a disadvantage, because an employer can enforce a restraint of 
trade clause without having to prove any facts . It has been argued that American 
147 le is there really a case to bring? 
148 Above n 45 . 
149 Although to a large extent this is the case already due to the delays inherent in gaining a fixture . 1t is 
hoped that tl1e case flow management system being introduced may speed this up. 
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Cyanamid does not apply in cases where there are exceptional circ
umstances, where 
granting or refusing the interlocutory injunction would dispose of 
the major issue of 
contention. 
150 In many cases a substantive trial may not take place until the rest
raint 
clause period has elapsed. The High Court in LEP International v Has
s found that there 
was a serious issue to be tried but the balance of convenience indi
cated that damages 
would be an adequate remedy. 
151 The plaintiff could not show that irreparable damage 
would result if the defendant was allowed to continue in his employment
. Conversely, the 
effect on the plaintiff upon granting of the injunction would be grea
t. Caution is to be 
advocated where an interim injunction would achieve the plaintiff's d
esired result ahead 
of a substantive hearing. There is some force to the proposition that 
the overall strength 
of the plaintiff's case against the defendant should be assessed. A
nother alternative 
would be to apply the balance of convenience test and have regard to
 the strength of the 
employer's case within that heading. 
3 Overall Justice 
Court has considered whether s 8 Illegal Contracts Act should com
e in to play at the 
interim injunction stage. In Castle Parcels v Dale the Court suggeste
d that s 8 should 
not be invoked at the interim injunction stage of proceedings. 
152 Once a clause is varied 
it is binding. However, to refuse to apply s 8 could effectively 
put an end to the 
proceedings. Most restraint of trade proceedings do not reach the 
substantive hearing 
stage. Key Graphics (Auckland) Ltd v Verhoeyen indicated that a
 clause could be 
modified if it were unreasonable. 
153 However if the restraint is unreasonable it is harder 
for the employer to satisfy the requirements of s 104(2) Employment
 Contracts Act that 
allows the Court to effect a modification, and no modification would o
ccur. In Dominion 
Breweries v Marshall the existence of the section 8 power to modify w
as deemed not to 
150 P.L. Davies, "Post Employment Restraints: Some Recent Developme
nts" Joumal of Business Law 1992. 
151 Above n 66. 
152 
( 1989) 2 NZELC 96,774. 
153 (1989) 2 NZELC 96,566. 
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be the sole reason for upholding the validity of a restraint. 
154 
The Employment Court had 
to consider the potential application of s 8. To gain an injunction DB had to establish 
that they had an arguable case. The Court had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt 
that modification should be made and other remedies would be inadequate or 
inappropriate. The time lapse before a substantive hearing should be considered. In the 
Greenwich case there was no substantive hearing scheduled in the foreseeable future . 
The DB case lies between Castle Parcels and Key Graphics in the judicial spectrum. An 
arguable case must be established that the Court can exercise its discretion to modify. If 
the employer can establish an arguable case that the clause can be modified an injunction 
will be granted. This leaves open the possibility of potentially unreasonable terms being 
enforced. 
One of the main difficulties with injunctions is that it takes so long to gain a fixture that 
the interim injunction in effect determines the case substantively. If, as in Ohio the 
restraint were to operate from the time that the judgment were handed down, this might 
not be the case. If we accept that in the majority of cases the interim injunction will 
determine the matter, it is vital that the Court should very carefully balance all the factors 
which are traditional considerations in the restraint of trade doctrine. 
154 Above n 45. 
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VIII Potential Developments/ Alternative Approaches 
The United States has formulated alternative approaches to restrictive cov
enants. There 
is merit in some of the approaches, especially where they serve to clari
fy the type of 
assessment the Court should be making. Not all of the proposals are as ben
ign. The trend 
in targeting employee benefits may well be something that New Zealand is 
yet to face. 
A Requirement of significant personal contact 
An employee should be able to demonstrate that they had no significant personal c
ontact 
with the client whilst employed. The employer' s records could be used to
 establish the 
degree of contact that existed. An employer should not be able to prevent an em
ployee 
from working for former clients. There is no legitimate interest to prot
ect. This test 
would not presuppose the employee' s dishonesty. 
B Solicitation Tests 
Washington considered a rule requiring solicitation in order that a restra
int be upheld. 
This test mitigates the hardship to the employee. If the burden of pro
of lay on the 
employer it may be an undue burden to discharge and offend the employ
er' s clients. A 
solicitation test causes detriment to all parties. The advantage that an emp
loyee receives 
can harm the employer whether there is solicitation or mere acceptance 
of the client' s 
business. Obtaining proof may be difficult where the client prefers th
e employee' s 
services and does not wish to harm its relationship with the employee 
by testifying. 
Expensive litigation would be necessary to decide whether or not the 
employee had 
solicited. The employee and employer could be harmed by gaining a 
reputation for 
dragging clients into Court . The client's testimony could have an adverse
 effect on the 
employer by revealing the reasons why the employee is preferred over the 
employer. The 
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solicitation test is of little benefit to the public as it does not effectively improve the 
public's freedom to choose the services of a professional. 
C Liquidated Damages 
Liquidated damages can be awarded where the employee had an unfair competitive 
advantage. This allows the market to determine the value of the employee's skills. Expert 
testimony could establish an amount that would reasonably compensate the employer for 
loss of clients. The harm to the public and the employee would be mitigated. This 
approach may be more acceptable to the business community. 
D Loss of Accrual Benefits: the "Bad Boy" Provision 
In the last twenty years in the United States there has been a substantial amount of 
litigation obliquely involving restrictive covenants. Instead of the employer enforcing the 
covenant, the employee is forced to take action to obtain their accrual benefits. For 
various operational reasons, an injunction may be insufficient to protect the employer's 
interests. Instead of relying on the covenant, the employer withholds a benefit that would 
otherwise have accrued to the employee upon termination of the employment 
relationship. The nature of the benefit withheld changes from industry to industry. It may 
concern company initiated pension top ups or performance linked payments. 
Employers have withheld employees' pensions as punishment for a breach of the 
restrictive covenant. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 prevents the 
contractual forfeiture of interest under a deferred compensation plan. 
155 The arrangement 
may involve more than one type of pension payable. In such cases the courts are 
prepared to divide the agreement and grant the employee such funds as are protected by 
ERISA, while withholding monies that do not constitute a pension plan under ERISA. In 
155 ERISA ss 3(2XA), (7), 203(a), (aX2XA-C), 502(a), 29 USCA ss I002(2XA), (7), 1053(a), (aX2X
A-C), 
l 132(a). 
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Darden v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company the court held that the fund at issue 
had two functions which could be separated. 156 The employer's deferred compensation 
plan was protected by ERISA. The extended earnings plan which gave the employee 
sums equal to their earnings in renewal fees over the last twelve months was held to not 
be a pension plan within the meaning of the Act.
157 In Hauck v Eschbacher employees 
entitled to benefit from an employee benefit scheme faced forfeiture of their entitlement 
for breach of a restrictive covenant. The former employees were not given notice of the 
alleged breach until 27 months after the employment relationship had ended. They had no 
real chance to cure the defect. The court held that a restrictive covenant in a profit 
sharing plan could not be retroactively applied. 
158 
156 922 F2d 203 . 
157 Above n 156, at 208. 
158 665 F 2d 843, at 847. 
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IX Whither? 
The New Zealand approach to restraint of trade is no
t innovative. The common Jaw has 
been modified on a case by case basis, without 
any re-evaluation of the doctrine. 
Restraints appear to be more common than they were
 twenty years ago. The duration of 
restraints has increased over the last ten years. Perh
aps this is a result of society's ever 
increasing awareness of the value of information. 
New Zealand has been tardy in its approach to issues 
of competition law. The Commerce 
Act does not have a real impact on restraint of trad
e in the employment context. The 
United States has had such conduct firmly in its legi
slative eye for a considerable time. 
Individual states have legislated to create a check on
 employer practices. The approach 
has been to attack the problem in two ways, by m
odifying the common law and by 
legislation. The requirement of solicitation and simi
lar occupational requirements is an 
interesting approach to the problem. The Georgia app
roach which strictly limits the types 
of employees to whom restrictive covenants may ap
ply seems to be eminently sensible 
and in the public interest. 
An obvious problem is the concurrent jurisdiction of the
 High Court and Employment 
Court. The writer perceives substantial problems with
 lack of clarity as to the boundaries 
of the courts. This inevitably leads to forum sho
pping as employers move for a 
determination in the High Court which is perceived 
to be more employer user friendly. 
Employees favour a determination in the Employmen
t Court. The jurisdictional debate is 
highly topical and will continue for some time. 
The High Court is more likely to modify the provision
s of a covenant to allow it to stand. 
This creates little incentive for the employer to m
ake a genuine attempt to draft a 
reasonable restrictive covenant. The Employment Cou
rt requires that the employer prove 
to the criminal standard that a restraint should be mo
dified. In practise this is very rarely 
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achieved. Instead of a harsh covenant being a
ltered and substantially enforced, it is struck 
out. 
New Zealand case law diverges from the tr
aditional analysis of restraint of trade. The 
recent Marine Helicopters decision is disturb
ing if it represents a new trend in the 
approach of the Employment Court. It ca
n only be hoped that it is a temporary 
aberration. 
The extension of the scope of implied duties
 leaves employees extremely vulnerable to 
pressure from employers. These factors co
mbined with the absence of any specific 
legislative guarantee of freedom of occupatio
n, means that employees have few options 
when faced with a restrictive covenant. 
The confusion caused by the variable s
tandard of analysis in both courts is 
counterproductive. Giving parties the optio
n of haggling over jurisdictional issues is 
similarly a waste of time and resources. Durin
g all of this the employee is unable to work 
and faces losing future opportunities as a resu
lt of the period of inactivity. 
If New Zealand wants to aim for a labour
 market that is vertically and horizontally 
mobile, we should consider legislating to ena
ble this. Legislation could resolve some of 
the difficulties by specifying the types of emp
loyee that a restrictive covenant may apply 
to . It could also help to clarify the factors that m
ust be considered when assessing the 
validity of covenants. Jurisdictional issues 
should be resolved by giving one Court 
jurisdiction over restrictive covenants. Deve
lopments in the United States give us some 
indication of the face of developments in restr
aint of trade. Whatever reform process may 
be decided on, New Zealand should be mindf
ul of Scylla and Charybdis and should steer 
a course that balances the interests of both p
arties. It is undesirable to create a shadow 
labour market, where motility is illusory. 
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